"Putin produces a personal favorable impression but created a horrible system"

In an article you wrote in late December to the Moscow Times, you wrote that Putin faces a more diverse and strong opposition... who is that opposition besides Navalny?

Well, definitely Navaly is the opposition leader number one. Actually, the recent events led to consolidation of the Russian opposition voters and the opposition politicians around Navalny. Previously, nobody could speak of him as an unconditional leader of the Russian opposition. Now, we can talk about this already, the process of unification of all the Russian opposition public behind Navalny has just started, it's not over yet. But it's definitely moving in that direction. And since he's in prison, it's definitely going to lead to all the Russian voters who are displeased with the current situation in the country, rallying around Navalny. Because when you put him in prison, you are like pointing with your index finger at the person "I'm telling He's my opposition". Navaly is in prison now. So, there is a big chance that sooner or later he will become somebody like Mandela in the South African case, he will become the undisputed leader of the Russian opposition. The situation is deteriorating for Putin. I don"t mean that many new opposition leaders are appearing, but the general mood in the country. The regime is getting little by little delegitimized, the social base on which it was grounded for 20 years, it's getting weaker, diluted, and more and more oppositional.

The general ratings of the authorities are decreasing. The rating of Putin is below 50%. His political party, United Russia, it's rating something like 30% now, and in half a year, we are going to have parliamentary elections. Previously, there was opposition in Russia, but it was mostly located in urban centers, in big cities, like Moscow, St.Petersbourg and some others; and then the province was very loyal to Putin. Recently, this started changing. First, it became visible half a year ago when we had protests in Khabarovsk, which is a province located far away, on the other side of the country, closer to Japan. And it's deep rural Russia. And all of a sudden, it exploded and it was a political process.

Previously, there were some protests similar in Russian regions, but they were mostly non political. It was either ecological or economical protests. And, all of a sudden, it became political, and anti Putin slogans were heard there. It was very strong. And during the recent protests, which were organized after Navalny arrived and got in prison in Russia, this process became visible. Again, not only Moscow came out into the streets, not only big provincial cities where you have millions of residents, but also people in small towns with populations like 100,000. For Russia it's small. It never happened before like this in 20 years. So, this is the new dimension. Obviously, Navalny is expanding his reach, he has high rating. You can"t tell that he is universally popular, but obviously he is advancing, he went into a ground, which previously was controlled, or totally controlled, by the government.

Is there any information about the conditions of detention at the prisional colony nr2 in Pokrov?

Well, there is information, yes, a lot. The Russian public is watching the situation very closely. It's considered to be one of the toughest Russian prisons, where all the prisoners are subject to very tough conditions. They're not beating people there, but like every hour, the person is coming to you, and you are not allowed to change your position, you should be sitting for the whole day on the chair, with your head bolted down. And once every hour, the official is coming and you should answer his questions showing that you're under total control. And I think that every two hours, at night, they're waking you up, and you should report your name, your legal status and things like this, just to show that you're under control. So it's a constant psychological pressure on the person. The main point is that the person is totally cut out from the outside world.

Their main point now is to make sure that Navalny cannot communicate with his supporters. From other prisons, you can organize communication with the outside world, there are legal and illegal mechanisms, which allow you to communicate through lawyers, or sometimes with the help of bribes, which is very popular in Russia. But still, you can do it. In this prison, in Pokrov where Navalny is now, that is basically impossible. It's out of question. So, the main point why they put him there, is to cut out all his communication with the outside world because the parliamentary elections are coming. And, as I told you, the Putin"s party United Russia rates, it is just 30%. It might be okay for a parliamentary democracy, but it's absolutely not enough for the authoritarian government in Russia.

Out of each 1/3 votes, they should make two thirds of mandates. To achieve this, you really have to use a lot of efforts. It's not easy, you should get the whole administrative machine of the country working to get control over the parliament, should be no opposition there. The only person actually who is able to destroy the government plans is Navalny, because he is popular enough among the opposition voters and he has his system.

They call it smart voting. Navalny is choosing in each electoral district a person who is not a member of Putin"s party. It might be just a mere figure head, the so called systemic opposition, people who are not extremely oppositional, it's mild opposition. But still, they are not United Russia candidates and Navalny is choosing, in each electoral district - we have 225 of them - one candidate who is capable of winning over United Russia candidate, and he's pointing out this person: "I'm telling all my supporters, please vote for this particular person". So the opposition voting, it's not getting spread between several different candidates. It goes very focused into the direction of one candidate and this candidate is winning. Navalny has got enough popularity and he can mobilize his voters. Other opposition leaders, they cannot mobilize their voters, they're usually staying at home thinking "well, it's useless anyway, they will steal our votes". Navalny has enough of charisma and drive, to infuse it into upon his supporters. He's making this vote mechanism work, and they're going and defeating the United Russia candidates. One year and a half ago, we had elections for Moscow parliament.

There were 45 electoral districts. In 20, out of 45, people that Navalny pointed, they won over United Russia candidates. Even among weak candidates, they managed to win almost half of the districts; out of 45, he won 20. So this system really works. And it's really a nightmare for Kremlin. So I'm sure that's why they arrested him. Actually, for many years, they didn't arrest Navalny because they did not want to make him a hero. They understood that as soon as they put him to prison, his popularity would start grow. Because personal drama appears, sympathy appears, this emotional aspect appears, they all give strength to Navalny.

But from the perspective of those in power, at this point there was no alternative...

This year, they didn't have the alternative because otherwise they would lose the parliamentary elections. And what kind of authoritarian system is it if you don't control, one of three branches of government, the legislative, the lower legislative chamber? The Kremlin didn't have any other way out, they had to make this step, which, in the long run is not good for Kremlin. But it still had to do it, otherwise it would lose the parliamentary elections.

Is there a chance that Navalny can be released before the parliamentary elections?

No, definitely. It's out of the question. They just put him to prison for him not to appear before the parliamentary elections. After the elections, theoretically speaking, they might let him out and then close him back again a bit before the presidential elections which are coming in 2024, or they might prefer to simplify the matter and just keep him in prison. They might decide, like, "we"ve already done it, we put him into prison, so let him stay there till 2024, till we make the presidential elections" Because, definitely, if Putin goes for the next term, what might happen in Russia might be something which we saw last year in Birelorussia in Minsk, the protests might be very strong, for the Russian public is really getting disappointed and displeased with Putin.

Who is the Russian opposition at this point besides the Communist party and Navalny? Is it this Party of New People?

Well, that is another thing. The Russian opposition is divided into systemic and non systemic. So, Navalny is non systemic opposition, they are never registered as parties or candidates, they are treated like real enemies. They are not allowed to take part in elections. So, they are like American spies in terms of how they are treated by Russian propaganda. The party of New People, it's another thing, this is systemic opposition, so to say, and they're really a big name among this systemic opposition. Actually, the only new name, as soon as the demand for new names, new ideas, new people is very strong, it's getting stronger and stronger. Actually, this is the main problem of the Putin"s regime, that people got tired of the same person, as head of the country, as the same elites, the same Members of Parliament, the same ideas spoken out. It's the same conservative traditionalist style, they probably got tired of this. So the demand for new people is very strong, and this new party, New People, they even named themselves like this, they really managed to hit this target. There's demand for the New People, but not among the supporters of the non systemic opposition. There are like 20% of people, roughly speaking, who totally reject Putin, and they're in favor of Navalny. So for them, New People, is not a good thing. For them, it's still part of the Kremlin game, what they call the system. But there are 20 or 30% or more, which are also against Putin, they don't like United Russia, but they're still not ready to make this revolution. Because Navalny is viewed by the public like a revolutionist, a person who's like Lenin, he is trying to make a revolution. So the majority of the Russian public, even if they don't like Putin, they don't want to make a revolution, they want this somehow to be solved without revolution, systematically, so to speak, like... through elections. So this New People is really making good among those people who are against the idea of revolution.

Is it too early to even imagine a Russia post-Putin?

Well, we can imagine, why not? I can tell you what might happen when the center of the system disappears. And, as the whole system is holding on to the center, it falls apart. So, definitely, what will have after Putin goes away? well, a sharp increase in social and political conflicts. Putin he's like the judge who is regulating this conflict, and the majority of people with the exception of Navalny supporters, so to say still 80% of the Russian people, they really believe that Putin has the right to regulate those conflicts. Whatever Putin says is like, the final say, so to say. After he speaks, the conflict is more or less solved. When this person disappears, there will be no longer authority to regulate those conflicts. All the social tensions, and contradictions, - we have a lot of them in Russia -, and they're actually increasing, between the center and the rural territory, between elites and regular population, rich and poor. So, all those conflicts will start coming into the open, nobody will be able to regulate them.

All the conflicts between clans of elites, when Putin disappears, no one will regulate those wars, and they will start waging wars with the help of the institutions they control. The main problem of Russia is that there are no fully political institutions, actually; they formally exist, but everybody knows nobody is trusting them, everybody knows that their main task is not to do what it is officially said they should do: the main task of the courts is not to impose justice, but to support Putin's rule. So, the main task of the law enforcement is not to fight crime, it's to fight opposition. So all institutions, even schooling and medical institutions look like this. They officially exist, but in reality, they are not functioning as proper institutions, they are all controlled by different members of different elites. Now they are functioning as a more or less unified system, because there is Putin who regulates this thing. But as soon as Putin disappears, this factor which creates this unified system will disappear as well. One of the oligarchs would control the courts, the other would control the police, the third would control the secret police FSB, and the fourth would control mass media, TV, and journalists, and there will be regional groups.

I'm simplifying now, but there will be much more of those groups. And those big groups will be split into smaller ones too. Like, one of them will control one part of FSB, the other will control the second part of FSB, the third one will control the third part of FSB, and so on. All these clans will start fighting for the full control over post Putin in Russia.

But that was what somehow happened in the last days of Boris Ieltsin...

That"s what we had, at the end of Boris Yeltsin in what we call in Russia the criminal nineties, the awful nineties, something like this. So, people are recalling those years and they're really scared. That's why, although they're really sick and tired of Putin, still don't want this revolution, they are hoping that somehow we would manage to get over this and somehow keep the system more or less well functioning, not falling into pieces like it was during the 90s. This is the main reason why Navalny"s appeal is limited. Otherwise, he would have his rating like 40, 50, 60%. Russians are really afraid of this all falling apart. But now they're less afraid of this than five years ago. Because the current situation is really making them sick. They really hate it already. And so, the prospect of future problems is not so scary because today it is already awful, their living standards are decreasing. They feel their rights are not protected, they already have these problems, actually.

What was your biggest learning from being speechwriter to Vladimir Putin?

My biggest learning? It"s not easy to tell... Well, no, yeah, I can tell about him personally, what I know. I never dealt with him directly. I was just a member of the team, and not the chief one, but that said, of course I saw him many times, like hundreds of times when he was having some meetings and sessions, even closed ones from the journalists, so I saw a lot of him. Personally he produces a really favorable impression. He is never authoritarian with the people with whom he's working. He's very attentive, he is listening to them. He is changing his mind, quite flexible, when it's necessary. He's really going into deep details. I worked for him twice. For one year, I worked for him Kremlin when he was just beginning, 20 years ago, I was very young at the time, it was 2001 or 2002. And then for two years, I worked when he was Prime Minister, it was much later on. So I entered his speechwriter"s team twice. When I worked with him for the first time, it was the beginning of his first term. Within the first year, his eyesight got much worse. I remember that we were ordered to make the letters on the documents much bigger. He was working so hard within the first year, that his eyesight got totally spoiled. I remember that. He was reading like tons of documents. And when I was working for him for the second time, when he was the Prime Minister, he was also very industrious. He was holding up to three, four public meetings a day when it was necessary and he was really going into deep details when discussing some particular subject like pensions, how they should be paid, so that the prosecutor's office doesn't object to what the local governments are making when they're trying to increase their payments to the elderly people, for example. Like for two hours, you're sitting and discussing this thing. It was of no political importance, actually, a pure legal issue. Being a authoritarian leader, who totally controls the country, he could have easily left to his ministers to solve these problems. No problem politically, if he had done this, but he didn't do it. He preferred to go into detail and find a solution. No matter what he was discussing, drilling oil, processing petrol, pensions, schooling, like, tourism, whatever, no matter what he was discussing, he was really going into deep detail. So he was very industrious. Personally, I like to have quite favorable impression of him. But politically, this system which he created, It's horrifying, of course. So there is a very interesting paradox: how a good person can create a bad system. This philosophic contradiction is probably the main thing which I have after I worked for him.

Why did you decided to leave that job?

Well, because you always want to move further. I was offered a more interesting job. Because I was one member of his team, but I was not the top official. And later, one of the regional governments, wanted me to come and work there as a deputy governor, responsible for the political process. And for me as a political scientists, as political consultant, It was like a good experience.

Because when you're working for Putin, you're not working on the ground, you are very high. And then all of a sudden, I got a chance to go down and work making the real essence, so to speak. So now I know much more about the Russian elections after I work there, because when you work for Putin, you don't know the details, you're making big game. But when you want to learn and grow professionally, you've got to know the details, how it's done on the ground, right? So I went down to the ground; usually people are getting from bottom up. In my case, it was vice versa. Just accidentally, It happened. When I was young. I happened to be on top and then I had to go down. Now, I'm just an independent political consultant.